Equity

The race to pace AI

Frontier labs – including OpenAI and Anthropic – are the architects of the world’s most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models, but after several high-risk incidents this year, the industry’s leaders are taking stock of whether AI is outpacing its makers.

Key takeaways
  • Major agentic AI models have revealed breaches and malicious activity
  • Industry players have acknowledged the challenges of the goal-oriented capability of their models
  • Global coordination to mitigate potential risks will be critical to limiting further incidents
  • Active investor engagement can contribute to the pacing of AI
  • AI pacing is unlikely to prove a significant headwind to AI’s trajectory

The term AI pacing refers to the speed and direction of the technology’s development. It has recently come into focus following a run of incidents at key frontier artificial intelligence labs moving safety from a background concern to an immediate priority. In several cases the trigger was the same: models operating inside “restricted” cybersecurity testing environments concluded that the most effective route to completing an assigned task was to break out of the environment and pursue the objective by any means available, including compromising live systems. In each case this happened autonomously, with no human in the loop.

Four particular incidents stand out this year:

Mythos moment – April 2026: Arguably the first clear signal of these safety breaches was when Anthropic’s Mythos model demonstrated it could autonomously discover software vulnerabilities and execute sophisticated, multi-step cyberattacks with minimal human guidance. At the time this was read as an early wake-up call and a spur to improve cybersecurity tools.

OpenAI compromise of Hugging Face – July 2026: This went further – internal agents escaping their intended testing constraints gained internet access by exploiting vulnerabilities and compromised parts of Hugging Face’s systems. They also breached OpenAI’s own internal grading systems to maximise their score on the task and, more strikingly, communicated and collaborated with one another to cover up any malicious activity. The Hugging Face hack developed from one agent working on a workflow in a separate sandboxed environment1 to over 700 agents communicating together and sharing general purpose ways to ‘cheat’ their respective tasks.

Prompted by that breach, Anthropic ran a sanity check on its own evaluation suite and found comparable behaviour with its Claude models compromising realworld systems.

The OpenAI intrusion into an Australian health service – August 2026: This saw agents access Australia’s Medicare Statistics Reporting Service portal, reaching both public and non-public files. The intrusion occurred in June but was only identified in August, during OpenAI’s internal review following the Hugging Face incident. Since then, reports by Transluce, an AI research non-profit, have identified this intrusion as similar to other incidents. The report found that some OpenAI agents conducting mundane data-retrieval tasks would hack databases if they came across security barriers, treating them as ‘obstacles’ meant to be evaded rather than strict boundaries.

Google Gemini incident – September 2026: This was a restricted test to find information on a fictional company. The agents located internet access and targeted a real company sharing the same name as the fictional company. Notably, the model reportedly stopped once it realised it had reached real-world systems.

Taken together, these episodes point to an uncomfortable conclusion: goal-oriented agents are difficult to predict and to contain. Each system pursued whatever course of action was most likely to achieve its objective, and in doing so reached for unintended methods. The tangible impact in every case was minor, but collectively the incidents have been read across the industry as a stark warning about the potential of agentic AI.

Shift in tone from AI leaders

In recent weeks, senior figures from frontier labs have publicly backed tighter control over model development. Dario Amodei, Anthropic co-founder, called on the industry to “slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models.”2 His concern is that recursive self-improvement may be advancing faster than researchers’ ability to understand and control the resulting systems – and that, on the current path, autonomous incidents of the kind above could precede more serious events of bioterrorism and economic disruption within 6–12 months.3 His proposed remedies include independent evaluators, shared safety standards among democratic countries, and further international coordination.

Sam Altman (OpenAI), Demis Hassabis (DeepMind) and Elon Musk (x.AI) echoed these comments, agreeing on the case for common safety standards across the frontier labs against a backdrop of several safety researchers departing those same labs over precisely these concerns.

Not everyone agrees. Mark Zuckerberg (Meta) and Jensen Huang (Nvidia) have argued for safety measures only where clearly needed, rather than as a blanket requirement for all models. They point variously to the merits of free-market discipline, the risk that regulation entrenches progress among incumbents, and a sense that the risks are being overstated.

When challenges become risks

The recent incidents have sharpened concerns around recursive self-improvement (RSI) – the process by which AI increasingly contributes to AI research and development in place of human researchers, producing compounding progress. RSI is widely viewed as the primary driver of the industry-wide acceleration in AI development, and the fear is straightforward: progress is beginning to outrun human understanding of what these systems are doing, eroding our ability to control them.

The scale of the risk is illustrated by Anthropic’s own workflow. By May 2026, Claude was writing more than 80% of the code for its models, up from low single digits in February 2025. However, many at Anthropic believed Claudewritten code was initially of lower quality than human-written code and only reached rough parity recently. This suggests an initial quantity-over-quality dynamic that has since corrected but could be a point of scrutiny elsewhere across the industry.

We are not yet at full RSI: a human still decides which goals to pursue. But the direction of travel – fully agentic AI – is towards minimising the human contribution, which in turn demands far greater reliability on how agents act. Amodei’s message highlights two areas where that reliability is still lacking. The first is alignment, where considerable work remains to ensure models are trained to be safe, ethical and compliant with guidelines. The second is interpretability: in his words, “we still only understand a tiny fraction of what goes on inside these models.”3 Interpretability is improving as a field, but the pace of capability development far outstrips it.

This helps explain why, when a model is handed a goal, its route to that goal is hard to anticipate – the central concern raised by the incidents above. The two problems are also mutually reinforcing: weaker interpretability makes misalignment harder to detect, while stronger interpretability would make it possible to locate misaligned behaviours and remove or modify them. Amodei has argued that getting a handle on interpretability is central to safe and controlled progress – making it an increasingly investable field in its own right, particularly if regulation tightens.

Pacing, not stopping

Crucially, “pacing” has been framed explicitly as controlled progress rather than a complete stop. The industry has reached a point of very advanced – and still advancing – capability, largely on the back of RSI and following recent incidents, safety should be reconsidered. As a result, OpenAI decided to pause the release of its newest AI model, GPT6.1, after failing to meet internal safety standards. The Head of Safety Systems at OpenAI, stated a refocus on the ‘trade off’ between alignment and safety after the model showed higher levels of deception and autonomy and occasional pursuit of tasks without user permission.

For all the focus on pacing the frontier, we do not read this as a headwind for AI infrastructure or capex which underpin current technology valuations and, increasingly, the wider US economy. Increased AI adoption and in particular new AI use cases can result in growing demand for AI Infrastructure. Just recently Meta launched its first consumer personal AI Agent, Muse. Notably Muse is not being run using a frontier model, instead it uses Meta’s internal Muse Spark models, which are not currently at the frontier level. Initial adoption has been viral with millions of users downloading the Muse application within the first week post-launch, making it the most downloaded free app in the US and Canadian Apple app stores. Further consumer AI agent products are expected to be launched later in 2026, potentially creating a new large AI use case. This kind of demand is supportive of the capex trajectory, driven by rising demand for compute.

Our take on proposed steps

Through our stewardship team, Allianz Global Investors has been engaging on AI governance since 2025 to better understand how companies are balancing innovation with the safeguards needed to mitigate emerging risks. We have previously written about the theme of responsible AI, discussing the importance of alignment of human values with AI development, and we reiterate this now, even more so in the face of technical advances outpacing governance and policy. Against that backdrop, we regard the steps proposed by the frontier labs as a directionally welcome development towards responsible AI, though some are more credible than others:

  • Independent third-party evaluation of model development – to verify that models, and the processes behind them, are properly aligned – is widely supported across the industry and, in our view, a necessary first step towards safer models.
  • Shared safety standards are a reasonable mechanism for managing the pace of development. Representatives of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta and Nvidia recently attended the White House to discuss establishing voluntary industry standards through which frontier developers would, in effect, regulate themselves without government oversight. While the absence of US federal support severely limits the prospect of any industrywide, federally applied standard today, it does provide the foundation for future regulation. It is important to note that leading AI companies made similar voluntary safety commitments in 2023 under the Biden administration. While these helped establish frontiersafety norms, recent AI incidents have raised questions about whether voluntary industry commitments alone are sufficient to govern increasingly capable AI systems.
  • Global coordination among major governments is the most ambitious of these three proposals. We think broad alignment on regulation is unlikely in the near term but key in the long term. Realistic preliminary steps such as knowledge-sharing around interpretability could still lift the baseline of safety in AI development globally while having limited implications for competitive positioning.

The underlying difficulty is that the technology is advancing far faster than any globally coordinated response, leaving a patchwork of regional approaches instead. The US administration has taken the stance of framing AI primarily through geopolitical rivalry and national security rather than safety, which has pushed regulatory activity away from the federal level and down to a growing raft of state initiatives. The EU moved early with the AI Act, but parts of its entry into force have been delayed and further changes may be underway to ensure innovation and productivity improvements are not unnecessarily compromised. China has seen strong progress in AI governance, evolving from a narrow focus on content control to a broader framework covering frontier risk and agentic AI. However, industry transparency remains a notable weakness with inconsistent disclosures on safety reporting.

While existing safety measures are widely agreed to be inadequate, a careful approach is needed going forward, in our view. Widespread and nondescript regulation could create limitations to future use cases while unchecked progress could impact trust in the technology, also impeding uptake. We do not see the proposed ‘pacing’ as a headwind to the long-term trajectory of AI or the capex underpinning it, and our engagement on the topic of responsible AI with our investee companies continues to confirm that the risks are understood and mitigated where possible.

1 Sandbox: a secure, isolated environment where experimental software can run without affecting the main system.
2, 3 Dario, Amodei, We must pace the frontier, September 2026

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